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March 1970] Recent Developments 
TRADE REGULATION-PRICE DISCRIMINATION-
Liability for "Fourth Level" Injury Falls Within 
the Scope of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 
as Amended by the Robinson-Patman Act-
Perkins v. Standard Oil Company 
of Cal.ifornia* 
773 
During the mid-1950's Clyde A. Perkins, a major independent 
wholesaler and retailer operating in the states of Washington and 
Oregon, bought substantial quantities of gasoline and oil from Stan-
dard Oil Company of California. During the same period, Standard 
also sold gasoline and oil to Signal Oil and Gas Company, a large 
wholesaler whose subsidiaries operated at wholesale and retail levels 
in the same area as Perkins.1 The price Standard charged to Signal, 
• 395 U.S. 642 (1969). 
1. In addition, Standard sold directly to its Branded Dealers, which are retailers 
that, in effect, comprise Standard's retail division. 
774 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68 
however, was lower than the price it charged to Perkins.2 Signal 
passed on the advantages of this lower price to its subsidiary, Western 
Hyway, which in tum sold at a reduced price to one of its own sub-
sidiaries, Regal Stations Company. The competitive effect of this 
price differential was that the retail stations operated by Regal were 
able to undercut Perkins' retail price. Perkins' consequent inability 
to compete resulted in a decline in sales and induced him to sell his 
business at a low price. He then sued Standard Oil for treble damages 
under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Price Discrimination Act,3 alleging that the financial injuries 
he suffered while competing with Regal at the retail level were a 
result of Standai:d's price discrimination at the wholesale level.4 
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon 
entered judgment in favor of Perkins;5 but the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the injury incurred by 
Perkins as a result of Regal's low retail prices occurred too far down 
the distribution chain for Standard to be liable under section 2(a).6 
The court of appeals noted that the coverage of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act is restricted to injuries caused by an impairment of com-
petition with (1) the seller ("any person who ... grants ... such 
discrimination"), (2) the favored purchaser ("any person who 
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination"), or (3) 
customers of the discriminating seller or favored purchaser ("cus-
tomers of either of them").7 Regal clearly did not fall within the 
first two categories, since it obviously was not the "seller" or the 
2. The Branded Dealers were also charged a lower price than was Perkins. 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964) provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of ~uch 
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different 
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the 
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such com-
modities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any 
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other 
place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such 
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition 
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such 
discrimination or with customers of either of them • • • . 
4. In two additional causes of action, Perkins claimed that his losse5 due to 
Standard's discrimination stemmed from his inability to compete (1) at the wholc 0ale 
level because of Standard's lower price to Signal, and (2) at the retail level becau~e 
of Standard's lower price to its Branded Dealers. 
5. The district court found Standard liable on all three counts. The district court's 
opinion is unreported. 
6. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1968). The 
court of appeals, however, concurred with the trial court's finding that Standard 
was clearly liable under the two additional causes of action, for the injury caused by 
its discrimination at the wholesale level in favor of Signal, and for that caused by its 
discrimination at the retail level in favor of its Branded Dealers. See note 4 supra. 
7. These quotations are from the Clayton Act § 2(a), as amended, Robinson-Pat-
man Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). See note 3 supra. 
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"favored purchaser." Moreover, the court of appeals reasoned, in 
terms of the distribution chain, Regal was too far removed from 
Standard or Signal to be considered a "customer of either of them." 
The Supreme Court, however, speaking through Justice Black, dis-
agreed with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation and held that this 
"fourth level" competitive injury fell within the scope of section 
2(a).8 Under the Court's expansive reading of the statute, Regal 
qualified as being a "customer" of a person who knowingly received 
the benefit of price discrimination.9 
In order to analyze the degree to which the Court has extended 
the protection of the Robinson-Patman Act in Perkins, one must 
examine the decision in light of the polestar case in this area-FTC v. 
Fred Meyer, lncorporated.10 In Meyer a retail supermarket chain 
(Meyer) induced suppliers to make contributions of money and goods 
to the supermarket's annual coupon book promotion. Such payments 
were not made, however, either to retailers in competition with the 
supermarket chain or to the wholesalers who supplied them.11 The 
Federal Trade Commission sought to enjoin the suppliers from par-
ticipating in this coupon book campaign, alleging that participation 
was a violation of section 2(d) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the 
Robinson-Patman Act.12 
In general, section 2(d) mandates that the supplier of goods must 
make promotional allowances available on comparable terms to all 
customers competing in the distribution of such products. Prior to 
Meyer the Supreme Court had never extended the protection of 
section 2(d) to include third-line injury.13 In Meyer, however, the 
8. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642, 646-49 (1969). 
9. In addition, the Supreme Court concurred with the Ninth Circuit's findings 
regarding Standard's liability on the other two counts. See note 6 supra. 
IO. 390 U.S. 341 (1968). For an extended discussion of the Meyer decision, see 
The FTC and Promotional Allowances: The Fred ,\feyer Quagmire, 55 VA. L. REv. 
718 (1969). 
11. 390 U.S. at 345. 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for anl person engaged in commerce to pay or contract 
for the payment of anything o value to or for the benefit of a customer of such 
person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for 
any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with 
the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities 
manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or con-
sideration is available on proportionately equal terms to all other customers 
competing in the distribution of such products or commodities. 
13. Earl Kintner defines third-line competitive injury as that injury which "is 
suffered by the customers of the supplier•s buyer three steps down the distribution 
chain." AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 67 (1964). In the context of § 2(d), this definition -means 
that if the supplier sells to a wholesaler who in turn sells to retailers, then those who 
purchased from that wholesaler must be provided with promotional allowances com-
parable to those granted to a retailer who bought directly from the supplier and who 
competes for sales with the purchasers in question. Following Kintner's reasoning, 
fourth-line competitive injury is that injury which occurs four steps down the dis-
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Court held that the supplier had the burden of ensuring that pro-
motional allowances were available on comparable terms to all 
dealers which were competing for sales at the retail level, regardless 
of whether the retailers bought directly from the supplier or through 
a wholesaler.14 According to the Court, failure to comply with this 
mandate resulted in liability when there was injury to competition 
at the third functional level. Thus, if one assumes, as do most 
writers,15 that Meyer provided the key theoretical jump necessary 
to extend the scope of the Robinson-Patman Act past the second level 
of competitive injury,16 then it becomes obvious that Perkins is 
merely an extension of protection to the next distributional level. 
It is clear that the majority of the Court in Perkins felt that its 
decision was merely an extension of the philosophy that it had ex-
pressed in Meyer. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Black noted 
the similarities between the type of action involved in Perkins and 
that in Af eyer; and he stated that "to read 'customer' more narrowly 
in this section than we did in the section involved in Meyer would 
tribution chain. In the Perkins context, it means that when Standard charged a 
discriminatory price as between Signal and Perkins, there was an injury to those re-
tailers who bought from Perkins and who competed at the retail level with Regal, a 
purchaser from ·western Hyway who, in turn, had bought from the favored Signal. 
The retail customers of Perkins were injured because when Regal received the benefit 
of the price discrimination which was passed down to it by Signal and Western, it 
was at a competitive advantage, and consequently other retailers were unable to 
compete effectively. Thus, Perkins, as a retailer, had a treble-damage action against 
Standard for an injury which manifested itself four steps down the distribution ladder. 
14. 390 U.S. at 358. 
15. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REv. 95, 266-71 (1968); 
The FTC and Promotional Allowances: The Fred Meyer Quagmire, 55 VA. L. REv. 
'718 (1969); cf. E. KINTNER, AN ANTRITRUST PRIMER 68 (1964). But see F. ROWE, PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r 205 (1962). For extended discussion, 
see note 16 infra. 
16. This may be a questionable assumption in light of the decision in Standard Oil 
Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). In that case, Standard of Indiana sold gasoline to large 
wholesalers at a price 1½¢ per gallon less than that which it charged to comparatively 
smaller service stations in the same geographical area. Some, but not all, of the 
wholesalers passed on these savings to retailers to whom they sold. Third-line injury, 
then, was clearly at issue. In its decision, the Supreme Court implied that it was 
deciding the case on the assumption that there was price discrimination (340 U.S. 
at 236), and it then held that Standard had the right under § 2(b) of the Clayton 
Act to establish a "meeting the competition" defense. Standard proved that defense, 
and the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in FTC v. Standard Oil Co., !155 U.S. 
396 (1958). One possible interpretation of the Court's implied assumption in its earlier 
decision is that there would have been liability for third-line injury but for the fact 
that the discrimination was justified in terms of meeting the competition. See E. 
KINTNER, supra note 15, at 68. Rowe, however, disagrees, arguing that because the 
Solicitor General repudiated the order of the Federal Trade Commission which 
established third-line liability, the government clearly was not prosecuting a third-line-
injury suit. See F. ROWE, supra note 15, at 205. But this position makes little sense 
in light of the fact that the repudiation came in oral argument in the 1958 case and 
had no effect on the assumption made by the Court in 1951 when the case was 
decided. Id. at 200. 
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allow price discriminators to avoid the sanctions of the Act by the 
simple expedient of adding an additional link in the distribution 
chain."17 
Furthermore, there is a considerable amount of language in the 
M.eyer decision which can be interpreted as laying the foundation for 
the Perkins extension. For example, although the Meyer Court was 
dealing with a section 2( d) case, it noted that Congress, when it 
drafted section 2(a), intended a very broad meaning for the word 
"competition" under that section, a meaning perhaps broader than 
that intended under section 2(d).18 This dictum in a section 2(d) 
case made it easier for the Court, at a later date, to construe section 
2(a) liberally enough to protect against the fourth-level injury in 
Perkins. Another way in which Meyer set the groundwork for the 
Perkins decision was the Meyer Court's agreement with an FTC 
finding that the extra value given to Meyer in the form of promo-
tional expenses not only constituted a violation of section 2(d), but 
also amounted to price discrimination which was prohibited by 
section 2(a).19 By equating the two sections in this manner, and then 
by extending section 2(d) to include third-line injury, the Meyer 
Court both implicitly expanded section 2(a) to include the third 
functional line and also shortened the step from section 2(d) to 
section 2(a). 
One should not conclude pre-emptorily, however, that Perkins 
is anything more than a limited extension of the Meyer doctrine. 
Because the third and fourth distributional levels in Perkins were 
occupied by partially 01vned subsidiaries of the second-level cor-
poration which had received the direct benefit of the price discrim-
ination, it is possible that the case will be limited to its facts. Justice 
Black hinted at such a limitation in his majority opinion when, 
after pointing out that Signal mvned sixty per cent of the stock 
of Western Hyway, and that Western Hyway in turn mvned fifty-five 
per cent of the stock of Regal Stations Company, he asserted that 
there was "no basis in the language or purpose of the Act for im-
munizing Standard's price discrimination simply because the product 
passed through an additional formal exchange before reaching the 
level of Perkins' actual competitor.''20 Justice Black's emphasis on 
the degree of ownership in the various subsidiaries, and his curious 
reference to a "formal" exchange, may indicate a willingness to 
limit the decision to situations involving wholly or partially owned 
subsidiaries. Justice Marshall underscored this possibility in his 
dis.5ent, when he urged the majority to clarify this point so as not 
17. !195 U.S. at 647. 
18. !190 U.S. at 356-57. 
19. !!90 U.S. at 345. 
20. !195 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added). 
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to imply by indirection that the same principles would apply if 
wholly independent firms intervened in the distributional chain.21 
On the other hand, there are several factors which militate 
against the conclusion that Perkins will be limited to situations 
involving subsidiaries. The Court did not specifically so limit its 
decision; and thus, since it was undoubtedly aware that such an alter-
native existed, the Court did imply "by indirection" that it intended 
no such limitation. Furthermore, the Court failed to implement 
the indirect-purchaser doctrine, which provides that if a manufac-
turer deals with a retailer through the intermediary of a wholesaler, 
dealer, or jobber, the retailer may nevertheless be considered a 
"customer" or "purchaser" of the manufacturer so long as the latter 
deals directly with the retailer and controls the terms on which 
it buys.22 Although the Court in Meyer had explicitly rejected the 
necessity of resorting to the indirect-purchaser doctrine as a means 
of extending the protection of the Robinson-Patman Act,23 it clearly 
could have resorted to it in the Perkins case by holding that Signal 
controlled Western Hyway and thereby controlled Regal's buying 
power and pricing policies. In this way the Court could have ac-
complished the same result in the case before it, without implying 
a further extension of the Act to cover fourth-line injury. However, 
since the Court did not explicitly limit the case to .its facts, and since 
it further refused to apply either the "subsidiary" rationale sug-
21. 395 U.S. at 651. Justice Marshall suggested that, as an alternative, the Court 
use the fiction of regarding the wholesaler and his retail customer as a unit for pur-
poses of § 2(a). This approach is basically the same as the one suggested by Justice 
Fortas in his concurrence in Meyer. 
22. The indirect-purchaser doctrine has been utilized to broaden the scope of the 
word "purchaser" under § 2(a) and that of the word "customer" under § 2{d). Cases 
arising under § 2(a) have required that two factors be present. The first is that the 
manufacturer must control the price which the wholesaler charges the retailer. See 
Purcolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
1045 (1968); Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953); Dentists' Supply Co., 
37 F.T.C. 345 (1943); cf. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). For cases 
in which lack of control has prevented application of the indirect-purchaser doctrine, 
see Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Klein v. 
Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560 (D. Del.), afjd., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956) (case 
severely questions the use of the doctrine); W.F. Shraft & Sons Corp., [1963-1965 
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 16,882 (FTC 1967). The second requirement is 
that the manufacturer must have dealt directly with the retailer. This requirement has 
been satisfied by direct negotiation of franchise agreements as well as by solicitation by 
the manufacturer of orders to be filled by the wholesaler. Purcolator Prods., Inc., v. 
FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968) (solicitation); 
Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953) (franchise). The efficacy of the second 
requirement has recently been called into question by the decision in Purcolator Prods., 
Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968). See generally 
Note, The Robinson-Patman Act-Price Discrimination-Indirect Purchaser Doctrine, 
12 N.Y.L.F. 91, 104 (1966). In addition, the efficacy of the entire doctrine has been 
questioned. See F. RoWE, supra note 15, at 58. 
23. 390 U.S. at 354. 
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gested by Justice Marsha112 -1 or the indirect-purchaser doctrine,25 
it must be concluded that Perkins was intended to be a full extension 
of the Meyer doctrine.26 
There remains some confusion, however, as to the future appli-
cation of the Perkins rationale. In particular, there may be some 
doubt concerning the extent to which future treble-damage plain-
tiffs occupying the third or fourth distribution levels in cases 
like Perkins must show injury to competition at those levels. In 
part, this confusion stems from the language of the Court's opinion 
itself. There is no mention of injury to competition at Perkins' 
level. Indeed, the Court speaks only in terms of damage to the sin-
gle competitor, Perkins himself. This omission of any reference 
to injury to competition, and the correlative emphasis on injury 
to the individual competitor, lead to the possible interpretation 
that Perkins gives a cause of action for price discrimination to a 
business far down the distribution chain whenever that business 
can show causally related damage to itself. Under that view, the 
competitor need not make a general showing of injury to compe-
tition at its level of distribution. 
Such an interpretation, however, seems to be an improper reading 
of the Perkins opinion. Proof of injury to competition at the plain-
tiff's level of distribution has always been considered an essential 
element in a cause of action for price discrimination; and it is doubt-
ful that the Court would seize upon the Perkins fact situation to 
make such an abrupt departure from the accepted literal interpre-
tation of the Robinson-Patman Act.27 Moreover, it seems that injury 
24. See note 21 supra. 
25. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
26. Indeed, such an interpretation of Perkins seems even more appropriate when 
one considers the difficulty that would ensue in attempting to establish substantial 
identity under existing case law for purposes of the unit device. The standard under 
the antitrust laws for establishing substantial identity between parent and subsidiary 
corporations is so stringent that the parent's control over the subsidiary must render 
the subsidiary a mere tool and compel the conclusion that corporate identity is a mere 
fiction. See, e.g., National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1955); Baim &: Blank, 
Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). These cases stand for the 
notion that even though the subsidiary is wholly owned, has an interlocking board 
of directors and the same operating officers, and has closely correlated operations, it is 
not sufficiently interrelated with the parent to establish a substantial identity. Since 
the Court in Perkins certainly realized difficulties of proving such a substantial 
identity and still failed either to distinguish the case on its facts or to use a fiction 
to blunt its thrust, it apparently meant Perkins to be a full extension of the protec-
tion of tl1e Robinson-Patman Act to cover fourth-line injuries. 
27. As has been seen, section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964), 
provides in part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person enga~ed in commerce • • • to discriminate 
in price •.• where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, 
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly 
receives the benefit of such discrimination or with customers of either of them 
..•• [Emphasis added.] 
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to competition at the fourth level could easily have been proved 
in Perkins, regardless of the motives behind Standard's price dis-
crimination. 28 To begin with, any price differential in the retail 
gasoline market, however small, may seem substantial to the con-
sumer. In addition, Perkins and other retailers operating at the 
fourth level were dealing with a standardized product and probably 
were operating on tight profit margins. These factors lead to the 
probable conclusion that Standard's discrimination resulted in 
appreciable shifts of consumer trade and formed a plausible basis 
from which the Court could have inferred injury to competition 
at Perkins' level.29 It appears, then, that Perkins does not give a 
cause of action to the fourth-level operator unless that operator can 
show that the price discrimination resulted in injury to competition 
at its level. 
Beyond this problem, there are some additional questions about 
the long-range practical effects of the Perkins decision. First, it is 
doubtful that Perkins really extends the protection of the Robinson-
Patman Act in as direct or effective a manner as did the Meyer de-
cision. In 1'•Jeyer, the Court held that when a supplier provides 
promotional allowances directly to one retailer, those same pro-
motional allowances must be offered at comparable terms to all 
other retailers, even those who buy through wholesalers, and that 
the supplier has the onus of guaranteeing equality of treatment 
at the retail level.30 This holding means that even if the supplier 
offered the allowances to all wholesalers on comparable terms, the 
supplier could nevertheless be held liable for treble damages should 
the wholesaler fail to pass on the allowances to retailers.31 That 
mandate directly promotes equality of treatment in the availability 
of promotional allowances and arguably protects competition at 
the retail level. 32 
28. There are at least three possible explanations for Standard's actions. One is 
that Standard desired simply to increase profits without regard to present antitrust 
legislation. A second and more plausible explanation is that Standard originally felt 
that its discriminatory prices were cost justified, but that they could not be proved 
to be so at trial. A final, but unlikely, explanation is that Standard was the victim 
of the superior economic power of the "middlemen," Signal or ·western Hyway. 
29. F. ROWE, supra note 15, at 181. 
30. 390 U.S. at 358. 
31. This interpretation follows from a literal reading of the following language 
of the opinion: "We conclude that the most reasonable construction of § 2(d) is one 
which places on the supplier the responsibility for making promotional allowances 
available to those resellers who compete directly with the favored buyer." 390 U.S. 
at 357. Since this result is so harsh, the Court may later read the quoted language as 
placing only a duty of due care on the supplier. To date, however, the supplier must 
still be viewed as the insurer of equality at the retail level. 
32. It is arguable, however, that the Meyer mandate ensures equality while de-
stroying competition at the retail level. For example, if it becomes too expensive 
to ensure equal treatment of small neighborhood grocery stores, large suppliers of 
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The Perkins decision, however, does not ensure such equality. 
In Perkins, the Court did not say or even imply that the prices ul-
timately offered to all retailers must be equal. It held merely that 
if the seller discriminates at the second level and the effect of that 
discrimination is passed on down the distribution chain, then the 
seller is liable for whatever damage to competition at the retail 
level was caused by its discrimination at the wholesale level.83 Thus, 
unless some deterrent value is garnered by exposing the supplier 
to increased liability such that it will act to ensure equality of the 
prices charged to retailers,84 the Court has not taken a large step 
toward promoting competition. Even if the supplier sells to all 
wholesalers at an equal price in an attempt to comply with Perkins,35 
the large, vertically integrated firms may continue to undercut in-
dependent operators which must deal through independent whole-
salers. Of course, their ability to do so depends on the economic 
circumstances of the situation, since increased size does not nec-
essarily increase the ability to compete. But in many circumstances, 
the large, integrated firms will be able to take advantage of eco-
nomies of scale in order to persist in charging lower retail prices 
than can independent operators, and will thereby continue to cap-
ture a large part of the retail market. Thus, it appears that unless 
Perkins can be read as requiring suppliers to ensure the equality 
of the prices to retailers, or unless it can be presumed that sufficient 
deterrence is gained by exposing the supplier to increased liability 
such that it will decide on its own to ensure competition at the 
retail level, the Perkins decision fails to achieve the same sweeping 
degree of protection of competition that the Meyer decision ac-
complished. 
In addition, there is the collateral problem that suppliers like 
Standard may find it difficult, if not impossible, to comply with 
the holding in Perkins. The next step in the analysis, then, is to 
examine a supplier's possible modes of compliance. There are two 
such methods and they are based on alternative interpretations of 
grocery items will concentrate on increasing their sales to the large, vertically in-
tegrated firms and will refuse to sell to the smaller retailers. Consequently, if the 
neighborhood retailers are unable to buy standard brands, they may not be viable 
competitors and may be forced out of business. Their failure would, in tum, reduce 
competition. 
!l!I. The plaintiff must, of course, prove a causal connection between the pro-
hibited price discrimination and the injury suffered. In Perkins, the Court held 
that this proposition was true regardless of the level at which the injury occurs. 
The Court further noted that the standard for proving this element of the cause 
of action is to present enough evidence to support an inference of causation. After 
this burden is satisfied, the jury then decides whether the inference is valid, and, 
if so, the amount of damages. !195 U.S. at 648. 
!14. See text accompanying notes 42-50 infra. 
!15. See note !17 infra and accompanying text. 
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the supplier's duty under Perkins: either the supplier can comply 
with the holding by charging the same price to all wholesalers, or 
it can comply only by ensuring equal prices to all retailers. 
Obviously, the preferable course of action from the supplier's 
point of view is for it to escape liability by charging the same price 
to all wholesalers. As indicated above, this mode of compliance 
seems to be based on the more appropriate interpretation of Per-
kins, since the decision probably does not require the supplier to 
ensure equality of prices at the retail level.36 Nevertheless, charging 
equal prices to all wholesalers does not make sense from an eco-
nomic point of view, since some wholesalers buy in considerably 
greater quantities than others and the resulting lower costs to the 
seller endtle the larger buyers to pay lower prices per unit.37 
The obvious response to this problem is that the supplier could 
vary its prices to different wholesalers; such variation is permissible 
so long as the unequal prices are cost justifiable.38 This approach 
seems ideal from a theoretical point of view; but in practice it may 
not represent an effective solution to the supplier's problem, since 
cost justification defenses are not only expensive to establish but 
very difficult to prove.39 Indeed, as of January 1964, the FTC had 
rejected twenty-three cost justification defenses, while allowing 
only six to succeed.40 These statistics have led many to conclude 
that the cost justification of price differentials has often remained 
illusory in practice.41 Thus, a supplier may be left with no prac-
ticable course of action with respect to wholesalers. It may find it 
economically infeasible to charge equal prices to all wholesalers; 
but if it attempts to charge them unequal prices, it cannot depend 
on the success of a cost justification defense in vindicating those 
prices. 
Therefore, a supplier may simply continue to charge discrim-
inatory prices, accept the risk of some liability as a fact of commer-
36. See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra. 
37. Obviously, if quantity sales reduce the cost per unit, then the purchaser b en• 
titled to some or all of the economic benefit of that reduced cost per unit. 
38. Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964), allows for a cost justification 
defense: 
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make 
only due allowanc~ for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery 
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities 
are to sud1 purchasers sold or delivered. 
39. Rowe, The Federal Trade Commission's Administration of the Anti-Price 
Discrimination Law-A Paradox of Antitrust Policy, 64 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 415, 424 
(1964); Note, Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act: The Standard 
Oil Litigation, 67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 294, 295 (1953). 
40. Rowe, supra note 39, at 424. The citations for these cases may be found in 
F. ROWE, supra note 15, § IO.IO, at 63 (Supp. 1964). 
41. Rowe, supra note 39, at 424. 
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cial life, and adopt the expedient of attempting to reduce the amount 
of liability which it could incur. In particular, the supplier may 
attempt to decrease the amount of exposure to liability resulting 
from suits by retailers, as opposed to those by wholesalers.42 It is 
necessary, then, to examine whether practicable methods exist for 
attaining that objective. 
Presumably, a reduction or elimination of potential liability 
at the retail level can be accomplished only by ensuring that all 
retailers pay the same price for their products, since there probably 
will be no injury to retailers when they are all charged the same 
price. This solution, however, is identical to that which was pos-
tulated for the second, and more tenuous, reading of the Perkins 
case, that is, that suppliers can comply with the holding only by 
ensuring the equality of prices to retailers. Thus, the merit qf the 
Perkins decision may ultimately rest on the resolution of the prob-
lem of controlling the prices charged to retailers. If Standard and 
the other major suppliers can find some way to control those prices, 
they will eliminate exposure to liability and at the same time ensure 
competition at the retail level. If suppliers cannot find such a so-
lution, however, Perkins may have resulted in nothing more than 
an increase in the number of privately instigated antitrust suits 
without any commensurate increase in competition. 
The obvious line of analysis, then, is to examine the possible 
solutions open to suppliers like Standard. One superficial solution 
is for the supplier to enter into resale price limitation agreements 
with the wholesalers to whom it sells. This practice, however, would 
obviously fall within the proscription of section I of the Sherman 
Act.43 Another possible solution is to charge the same price to all 
retailers and wholesalers. This course of action would be foolish 
not only from an economic point of view,44 but also in terms of 
antitrust policy, since it would eliminate most of the wholesaler's 
business and thereby establish competition at the retail level by 
destroying it at the wholesale level.45 A further possibility along 
42. Of course, the supplier would still be vulnerable to suits from wholesalers, 
but it was liable in that area before Perkins and was able to include the costs 
of such suits in its pricing structure. 
43. 15 U.S.C. § I (1964). See, e.g., United States v. McKesson &: Robbins, Inc., 
351 U.S. 305 (1956). In that case, the Court held that McKesson &: Robbins, a drug 
firm which served as both a manufacturer and a wholesaler, committed a per se 
violation of § l of the Sherman Act when it, as a wholesaler, entered into resale price 
maintenance contracts with other wholesalers. 
44. This approach would be foolish in terms of economics for the same reasons 
that would make it foolhardy to sell to all wholesalers at the same price. See text 
accompanying note 37 supra. 
•15. If wholesalers and retailers all bought at the same price, there would be 
no possible profit margin left for the wholesalers, except perhaps for that on 
freight charges, and consequently the wholesalers could not afford to stay in business. 
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this same line is for the supplier to integrate vertically and to take 
over the wholesale function entirely. Here again, however, the 
supplier would possibly be guilty of violating antitrust laws.46 One 
final possibility is for the supplier to sell to its wholesalers on a con-
signment basis and in that way exercise more control over the ul-
timate price of the goods. That solution also seems doomed to 
failure. Although this exact issue has never been litigated, the theory 
on which the cases dealing with consignment sales to retailers have 
been decided demonstrates that a consignee may be considered a 
purchaser for section 2(a) purposes if the facts indicate that the 
consignment relationship is being used as a covert means of price 
control.47 Thus, in light of the precedent, it appears that if this type 
of arrangement were ever tested by litigation, it would be held to 
be illegal price fixing violative of both the Sherman Act48 and the 
Robinson-Patman Act.49 While the preceding list may not be ex-
haustive, it illustrates the extreme difficulty that suppliers face in 
trying to find both a legal and a practical form of compliance with 
the Court's decision in Perkins.50 
No doubt the independent wholesalers realized this possibility after the Meyer deci• 
sion when they strongly urged the FTC not to pass its amended guides for adver· 
tising because those guides would give the suppliers more control and would both 
increase expenses for wholesalers and cut their profit margins. See generally Com-
ments of the National Oil Jobbers Concerning Proposed Amended Guides for Ad-
vertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services (Sept. 31, 
1968) (open letter to the FTC). See also Note, The FTC and Promotional Allowances: 
The Fred Meyer Quagmire, 55 VA. L. R.Ev. 718 (1969). 
46. In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 347 U.S. 89 (1955), the Court 
held that although vertical integration per se does not violate § 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), it may become illegal if it is entered into with a specific 
intent to control the market. Furthermore, if the attempt is done through the vehicle 
of corporate merger, it may be circumscribed by § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 
(1964). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294: (1962). See generally 
Blackford, Vertical Acquisition and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 17 W. REs. L. R.Ev. 
102 (1965). Finally, regardless of the manner in which the integration is accomplished, 
the process requires a huge amount of cash. Today, due to the tightness of the money 
markets, available funds are either minimal or nonexistent. 
47. Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955), 
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956); Stanton v. Texaco, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 884 (D.R.I. 
1968). 
48. For a discussion of Sherman Act liability, see First Natl. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities 
Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ijustice 
Harlan, dissenting); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); United States v. 
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
49. For a discussion of Robinson-Patman Act liability, see note 47 supra. 
50. Indeed, faced with the probable failure of any attempt to comply effectively 
with Perkins, the suppliers can take only defensive action. They cannot set up a 
reserve to insure themselves against damages resulting from private antitrust suits, 
since all of the events which fix the amount of liability and which establish the lia· 
bility itself do not occur in the proper sequence. Consequently, the suppliers must 
wait until the losses actually occur before they can write off both the damages and 
the legal fees as tax-deductible expenses. See Commissioner v. Fifth Avenue Coach 
March 1970] Recent Developments 785 
One must conclude, then, that the Court has placed suppliers 
like Standard in an untenable position without a commensurate 
increase in the amount of competition at the retail level. If the 
supplier chooses to comply with Perkins by charging all wholesalers 
the same price, it will be forced to act uneconomically and there 
will not be an appreciable effect on competition at the retail level. 
Furthermore, if the supplier attempts to comply by charging dif-
ferent prices to different wholesalers-its most probable course of 
action-it runs the serious risk of being unable to prove that its 
prices are cost justified. Conversely, if it decides to comply by con-
trolling the price charged to retailers, it may destroy competition 
at the wholesale level in order to establish it at the retail level; 
and thus, there will be no net gain in the total amount of compe-
tition. In addition, the supplier may expose itself to liability for 
violation of other antitrust laws. Therefore, regardless of the inter-
pretation of Perkins, the effect of the case may be economic loss 
to the supplier with little gain in the over-all amount of compe-
tition. Moreover, while the Perkins rationale may be a desirable 
approach when a huge corporation like Standard is involved, it 
would certainly yield disastrous results if applied to smaller sup-
pliers which might be forced out of business by the resulting losses. 
Accordingly, if the Perkins decision is not subsequently overturned 
or at least limited to its facts, it may impede competition rather 
than promote it. 
Lines, Inc., 281 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1960); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a); Rev. Rul. 
64-224, 1964-2 CUM. BuLL. 52; Wright, Tax Formula To Restore the Historical Effects 
of the Antitrust Treble Damage Provision, 65 MICH. L. REv. 245 (1966). To make up 
the difference between the amount of the total loss and the resulting tax saving, sup-
pliers may simply raise the price of gasoline so as to pass on the costs of the Court's 
edict to the consumer. 
